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Liberia
This was intended to be the year that Liberia made major steps towards peace, stability and
thé rehabilitation of its government after 14 years or more of war. At the beginning of the
year, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), established on l October 2003, was
still building up to its fall strength of some 14,785 soldiers, 215 military observers, 755
civilian police, 360 uniformed police units, 635 international staff, 798 national staff and
431 United Nations volunteers. The UN General Assembly had been asked to appropriate
some $ 840 m for UNMIL for the 12 months beginning l August 2003, indicating the size
of the budget required for the world's largest UN mission. UNMIL enjoyed a robust Chapter
7 mandate, with authority to disarm and reintegrate former fighters, to assist in the recon-
struction of Liberia's national police force and to assist in reestablishing national author-
ity throughout the country. The UN mission was empowered to work with the National
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), an interim administration established by
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CFA) signed in Accra on 18 August 2003 between
the former government of Liberia and the two main armed factions opposed to it. The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was intended to put a final stop to the war that had been
fought in Liberia in fits and starts since the 1980s. It was made possible by the departure
' into exile of Liberia's elected president, Charles Taylor, on 11 August 2003 and his replace-
1! ment by a government composed of members of the three armed factions that had been
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disputing control of the country, under a chairman of their choosing, thé former busmess-
man C. Gyude Bryant.
By the end of the year, both the National Transitional Government of Liberia under lts
chairman, Bryant, and UNMIL under special représentative Jacques Paul Klein, an
American diplomat and former air force général, were sticking to their timetable for organ-
ising genera! and presidential élections in October 2005, prior to the inauguration of a new
elected government m January 2006. However, many observers, including senior UNMIL
officials, were concerned that Liberia's réhabilitation was being blown off course by an
unduly compressed timetable, vast corruption in the Liberian government and mistakes
by the UN administration. There was a notable loss of confidence among international
donors, whose attention was diverted during the course of the year to other emergencies,




Liberia's transitional government, inaugurated on 14 October 2003, contams 21 cabinet
ministers. These, plus a range of other senior government positions, are members or nom-
inees of Liberia's former armed factions. One of the three such groups mvolved is the for-
mer government of Liberia, previously ledby ex-President Charles Taylor, itself origmally
formed from an armed faction active in the 1990s. The other two components of the interim
government are Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). These two armed groups had mflicted a
military defeat on Taylor's government in June-July 2003 with significant (although
unavowed) backing from sub-regional powers, especially Guinea, and discreet support
from the US government. The same three factions were also able to appoint members of
Liberia's National Àssembly, although this also contained représentatives drawn from
Liberian 'civil society.' However, some of the civil society représentatives could more
accurately be described as politicians not aligned with any of the three former armed
factions.
As a conséquence of these arrangements negotiated in Accra, the transitional government
contained many familiär faces from the war, such as Defence Minister Daniel Chea, who
had held the same position under President Taylor, or Labour Minister J. Laveli Supuwood,
who had also been a senior member of Taylor's armed faction before joining LURD, or
MODEL leader Thomas Yaya Nimely, appomted as foreign minister after discreet pressure
from Côte d'Ivoire's President Laurent Gbagbo, a key backer of MODEL. UNMIL chief
Jacques Klein was quoted as saying that "each of the warring factions got mimstries which
are then staffed top to bottom with their people." In fact, deputy and assistant ministers do
not corne from the same faction as the minister, and ministers and their deputies and assis-
tants often disagreed with one another in conséquence. This contributed to the genera! dys-
fnnction of government.
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The nature of the transitional government had a notable impact on some of the key issues
affecting reconstruction. Justice Minister Kabinah Janneh, a leading member of LURD, pro-
nounced himself opposed to a war crimes court. Chairman Bryant, although not himself a
member of any of the former armed factions, also publicly expressed opposition to the
establishment of a truth commission or a war crimes court, although a truth commission was
on thé way to being constituted by year's end. Other ministers and senior officiais too were
opposed to prosecutions for crimes committed during the civil war. This was unsurprising
inasmuch as some of Libéria's most notorious warlords held key posts and were to be seen
driving around Monrovia with official escorts. In particular, thé powerful speaker of the
National Assembly, George Dweh, from thé LURD faction, was widely known for his
involvement in death-squad activities during the presidency of the late Samuel K. Doe
(1980-90). Many senior UNMIL officials had served in other UN missions, notably in
Bosma: some expressed their amazement that thé UN found itself playing a rôle in a situ-
ation where thé leading instigators of a war continued to enjoy such immuniry and were
even able to use thé transitional period to strengthen their positions.
Perhaps for related reasons, thé government declined to pétition thé Nigérian government
for thé extradition to Sierra Leone of former Président Charles Taylor, who has been
indicted for war crimes by Sierra Leone's spécial court. At year's end, Taylor continued to
live in Calabar, Nigeria, as a guest of thé Nigérian government. Although he was reported
to hâve curtailed his earlier communications with politicians and others in Libéria after
warnings from his Nigérian hosts, Taylor's présence in thé sub-region continued to cast a
shadow over Liberian politics. Key associâtes of Taylor, including his wife, Jewel Howard
Taylor, remain in Libéria.
Within some of thé factions, even as they were officially transforming themselves into
political parties, continuing factional struggles affected national security. Inside LURD
there was a movement to unseat thé movement's chairman, Sekou Conneh. The dissident
group was led by military commanders who supported Conneh's estranged wife Aisha.
Rival factions fought each other in thé Bushrod area of Monrovia - a LURD fiefdom - in
August. LURD was also prominent in attempts to replace Gyude Bryant as head of the tran-
sitional government, notably in a 26 January joint statement co-signed by the leader of
MODEL. These efforts were unsuccessful, and Bryant finished the year in a relatively
strong position. However, it is unlikely that he will émerge as a key figure in Liberia's future
politics since according to thé terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as chairman
of thé transitional administration he is disqualified from seeking élection to thé presidency
inOctober2005.
As évidence mounted of corruption among senior government officiais, many observers
conchided that members of thé transitional institutions regarded thé intérim period as an
opportumty to use their officiai positions to make money in thé shortest possible time, since
some of them were unlikely to be able to continue in government after the end of the year.
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This may have been one factor contributing to thé growing perception that thé transitional
government had little interest in tackling thé problems needed to clear thé way for an elected
government that would restore Libéria to normality.
UNMIL's main concern during the year was disarmament. The disarmament exercise
had started badly on 7 December 2003, when a first attempt had to be abandoned after
administrative problems had led to violent disturbances by former fighters angry at bemg
unable to hand in their weapons for cash. At least eight people were killed, causing
UNMIL to suspend thé disarmament process pending new arrangements. After thé speedy
termination of the first attempt at disarmament, a second phase began on 15 April. While
thé CFA had provided for thé establishment of a 'National Commission for Disarmament,
Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration', in practice much of the planning and
implementation was the work of a 'Joint Implementation Unit', largely composed of civil-
ian staff, that was under thé immédiate authority of the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) rather than of UNMIL.
The disarmament exercise, substantially completed by 31 October 2004 but extended for
a further three weeks in some remote areas, caused considérable controversy. This was
mostly due to the very high numbers of people registering as ex-combatants and thé com-
paratively small numbers of weapons or munitions that they surrendered. UNMIL had ong-
inally estimated that about 38,000 fighters would register for disarmament, becoming
eligible for a $ 300 payment, and it planned further help with rehabilitation and réintégra-
tion. Other sources too had made estimâtes of a roughly comparable order. In regard to num-
bers of weapons, in February Jacques Klein estimated that there were around three weapons
for each combatant in Libéria. However, at thé completion of the programme, more than
102,000 people had registered as ex-combatants, handing in more than 27,000 guns and
some 6.15 million rounds of ammunition. It was also notable that few heavy weapons were
handed in, although thé intensive bombardment of Monrovia in mid-2003 had revealed that
thé factions possessed quite a few heavy artillery pièces. Hence, at the end of the disarma-
ment exercise in November, the UN had collected only one weapon for every three to four
people reporting themselves as ex-combatants, and there had been more than twice as many
people reporting at disarmament centres as anticipated.
The most likely explanation for thèse surprising figures was that the leaders of former
combatant groups had sold many of their heaviest weapons in neighbouring countries, as
intelligence sources suggested. Military commanders of armed factions also appeared to
hâve distributed small amounts of ammunition and light weapons to non-combatants who
could then deliver them in return for a cash payment of $ 300, which they were then required
to share with the military commander who had provided thé ammunition. In this way they
were able to benefit from thé conditions for registration introduced before thé second phase
of thé disarmament exercise, opening on 15 April, which permitted anyone who produced
150 rounds of ammunition to qualify for processing as an ex-combatant, and not only
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people who handed over weapons. Some fighters had already experienced one or even two
previous disarmament processes, in Liberia in 1997, but also in Sierra Leone, where some
Liberians had also fought.
The fact that a substantially higher number of people were registered äs ex-combatants
than had been budgeted for left little money for the other leg of the disarmament and réin-
tégration programme, namely provision for thé rehabilitation of former combatants. By
November, only some 11,000 ex-combatants were registered in various UNMIL training
or work-creation projects, with almost 5,000 others registered as undergoing formai édu-
cation, but with no guarantee that they would be able to pay school fées. Aid donors had
also established some other job-création schemes, most notably the US Agency for
International Development (USAID), which ran a substantial infrastructure-repair pro-
gramme that provided work for several thousand more ex-combatants, but this was a rather
short-term solution. The risk in thé longer term was that tens of thousands of ex-combat-
ants who were unaccounted for after disarmament might turn to robbery or enlist as
fighters in wars elsewhere in West Airica. In September, the transitional government and
UNMIL circulated to donors a joint document pointing out the security threat posed by ex-
fighters that had not received any rurther training or cash. Chairman Bryant repeatedly
called for more money for thé fund. UNICEF chief executive Carol Bellamy also criticised
donors for failing to fond thé resettlement and retraining of former combatants. She did
mention, however, that 85% of thé former child soldiers that had been associated with
armed forces had returned to their families.
Other aspects of dealing with thé massive problems of restoring stability to Libéria and
establishing an efficient government caused further problems. In mid-year, thé World Food
Programme was feeding some 490,000 people, including internally displaced persons and
newly returned refugees, as well as malnourished people. By the end of the year, there were
still over 300,000 displaced persons, many of them living in camps, waiting to return to their
homes, as well as hundreds of thousands of Liberian refugees living in neighbouring coun-
tries. The exact population of Libéria is unknown as the last census was in 1984 and years
of war have caused massive disruption, but is put by the US government at some 3.2 m.
On a more positive note, there was some progress in establishing a new Liberian police
force to replace the old force that was largely untrained and unequipped, highly politicised
and notoriously corrupt. On 13 July, UNMIL and the transitional government jointly
launched a programme to recruit new police officers. The intention was to form a new force
of some 3,500 people who would receive training from experts employed by thé UN, as
well äs proper equipment Progress in reorganising the armed forces was somewhat slower,
but by year's end préparations were in hand for a new army to receive training from a US
private security Company that had previously worked for the UN in Bosnia.
Probably the most serious security concern during the year was the outbreak of rioting
in a suburb of Monrovia on 28 October. Said to have been sparked offby a disagreement
over sales pitches in a market, it soon mobilised ex-fighters of rival factions and took on a
•m
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religieus form, with attacks on mosques and businesses owned by members of the
Mandingo ethnie group, who are generally known as Muslims and who were widely asso-
ciated with support for the LURD faction. Subséquent reports suggested that the violence
had been planned by some ex-Taylor commanders, and that the attacks on mosques were
part of a wider strategy to provoke violence on religious grounds. At least 17 people were
killed, with similar incidents being reported in other towns, including Kakata, Ganta and
Buchanan. The gravity of the incident lay not just in the numbers of casualties and m the
damage caused, but also in the indications that some key members of the old armed fac-
tions were reorganising and were developing stratégies for the future, still based on the use
ofviolence.
Nevertheless, there seemed little doubt that national élections would proceed m October
2005, with the UN and the mam international donors strongly rejecting any arguments for
postponement. Some 40 people declared themselves as presidential candidates, includ-
ing the former world football star George Weah, who made his announcement on 23
November. Although Weah had almost no political expérience, and no expérience at all m
government, it was generally agreed that this constituted part of his likely political appeal,
as hè was untainted by participation in Liberia's war, while his name was almost umver-
sally known. However, among the candidates who had declared themselves to be running
for the presidency in October 2005, there were also plenty of experienced politicians and
administrators.
Foreign Affaire
Since mid-2003, the Liberian peace process has received unprecedented outside support,
from sub-regional powers and from major donors and the UN. This has occurred at a time
when the UN has had major missions in neighbouring Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. But
there was little effective coordination between the three missions in regard both to strate-
gie issues and to tactical matters such as disarmament. For much of the year, for example,
UNMIL was not deployed at key border crossings with neighbouring countries. This clearly
raised questions concerning thé possibility of armed groups manipulating thé disarmament
exercises.
The Liberian government, however, did make efforts to improve its relations with its
neighbours. On 20 May, Chairman Bryant led a délégation to Guinea in an attempt to
revive thé Mano River Union. In regard to Sierra Leone in particular, one of the major
obstacles was the question of former president Charles Taylor. The special court for Sierra
Leone continued to press for his extradition from his home in Calabar, Nigeria. Officers of
thé spécial court for Sierra Leone and some US officiais confirmed earher média reports
that Charles Taylor had cooperated with al-Qaida both before and after 1 1 September 200 1
- although other US officiais, including from leading intelligence agencies, could not
confirm this allégation. A senior al-Qaida operative arrested in Pakistan on 25 July, Ahmed
l ,3
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Khalfan Ghailani, suspectée of mvolvement in the 1998 bombing of US embassies in east
Africa, was reported to have spent at least three years living in Liberia from the late 1990s.
In regard to the wider world, one of the most important changes in Liberia's foreign rela-
tions during the year was its récognition of the People's Republic of China. Previously,
Liberia had been for some years one of several African countries that had alternated between
récognition of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan). This was
generally a question of blatant financial interest: the Taylor government had secured exten-
sive fmancial support from Taiwan, and Taylor was reported to have gone into exile on 11
August 2003 in possession of $ 3 m given by the Taiwanese government for disarmament.
One of the interim government's first acts was to recognise China in place of Taiwan. In
January, Beijing deployed 500 troops to the Liberian opération, its biggest-ever commitment
to a UN mission. In général, China showed a marked interest in both Libéria and other African
countries, most particularly in regard to purchases of minerais and other commodities. >
Chairman Bryant travelled extensively during thé year, including three visits to thé US,
during one of which he met US Président George W. Bush. On 3 June he addressed thé UN
Security Council, pleading forcefully - but unsuccessfully - for thé lifting of économie
sanctions against Libéria (see below). Although thé US government provided substantial
fmancial help to UNMIL and was offering direct support for spécifie sectors, such as retrain-
ing thé Liberian armed forces, US officials made clear that they did not envisage further
major aid to Libéria after thé termination of thé transitional arrangements and thé restora-
tion of an elected government.
Socioeconomic Developments
On 5-6 February, a donor's conférence on Liberian reconstruction was held in New York,
co-chaired by Kofi Annan and Colin Powell. It pledged some $ 520 m, with thé US pledg-
ing some $ 245 m for peacekeeping and S 200 m for other purposes. However, at the end
* of thé year, it remained unclear how much of this money was still earmarked for Libéria or
|t whether it had been reallocated for other uses.
îf| Both thé transitional government and UNMIL continued to radiate optimism about an
early return to normality, but there was growing évidence of problems. In Monrovia, one
,of the most contentious issues was the provision of mains electricity, which bas not been
available for years. Although some progress was made initially through rehabilitation of the
national electricity corporation, the modest improvements in electricity supply were soon
reversed due to corruption, as officiais embezzled money or privately sold fuel and spare
parts that were needed for the power supply. Similarly, government promises to reduce thé
priées of petroleum products and rice were not realised. One of the government's main poli-
cies was to centralise revenue collection, but there were consistent reports that much rev-
enue never made its way to thé central treasury.
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A further example of how government disarray or corruption could have an impact on
development concerned the export of a stockpile of hundreds of thousands of tonnes of iron
ore that had lain on the quayside at Buchanan since the early 1990s. Various international
business consortia expressed an interest in buying the stockpile, perhaps as part of a larger
deal incorporating réhabilitation of the railway line from the iron ore mines at Yekepa to
the port at Buchanan. A Chinese consortium negotiated to buy the Buchanan iron ore stock-
pile in rather unclear circumstances. Liberian political activists, learning that the iron ore
was being loaded on board a Chinese ship, obtained an injonction from the suprême court
preventing the sale of the ore. Nevertheless, loading continued in défiance of the court order
and the Chinese ship sailed away fully loaded on 15 September. It is unclear precisely how
much money was paid for the ore, or which officials received it.
International sanctions continued on various economie activities, including Liberia's dia-
mond and timber trades. These were originally imposed by UN Securiry Council Resolution
1343 in May 2001 as a means of preventing then President Taylor's government from sup-
porting the déstabilisation of Sierra Leone, but international attention had gradually turned
to using sanctions as a way of putting pressure on the Liberian government generally. The
domination of the National Transitional Government of Liberia by nominees of the former
armed factions threw doubt on the government's ability to inspire international confidence
that it had eliminated the risk of abuse or smuggling in regard to timber and diamonds in par-
ticular. MODEL nominees had control of the FORESTRY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
AND THE BUREAU OF MARITIME AFFAIRS, enabling this former armed faction to
continue profiting from national resources much as it did when it was still a rebel group.
Largely for this reason, the UN had still not lifted its sanctions on Liberia by year's end. On
17 June, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1549, re-establishing a panel of experts,
pursuant to Resolution 1521 of 2003, to conduct a report on the violations of sanctions. Three
months earlier, on 12 March, the UN Security Council unanimously agreed to freeze
Taylor's assets to prevent them from being used to déstabilise the country. Timber and rub-
ber are Liberia's main export items, with the country eaming more than $ 78 m and more than
$ 57 manualy from timber and rubber exports respectively. Liberia also bas the world's sec-
ond-largest ship registry, with more than 1,800 vessels registered, including 35% of the
world's tanker fleet.
The scale of Liberia's economie problems is daunting. lts debt is generally estimated to
be a little over $ 3 bn, and continues to accrue interest. This sum consists of debts to the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral institutions, plus
Germany, France, Japan, the US and the African Development Bank. The transitional gov-
ernment, on the other hand, inherited a treasury containing just $ 2 m. In his annual state
of the nation address on 26 January, Chairman Bryant recorded that government had rev-
enue of $ 21. l m - largely from its ship registry - and expendirure of $ 17 m. There was
considérable improvement in this regard: during the year from l January, actual revenue
collected amounted to $ 68.2 m, while expendirure was $ 67.8 m.
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Liberia is often excluded from statistical tables due to the poor quality of its figures.
However, it is reckoned that more than 80% of thé population is formally unemployed, and
74% has no access to safe drinking water. Life expectancy is 48 years and infant mortahty
157 deaths per 1,000 births.
West Africa continues to attract interest in the oil industry on account of the ongoing dis-
coveries of important offshore reserves. In regard to Liberia too there was interest in off-
shore oil exploration. Liberia's offshore waters are currently divided into 17 blocks of
unusually small size, an arrangement made by the Taylor government that was presumably
intended to maximise the possible signature bonuses to be gained from contacts for explo-
ration. One of the first actions of the new administration led by Chairman Bryant was to
license the offshore oil-concession blocks.
Negotiations on oil exploration, and the controversy surrounding the export of iron ore
from Buchanan, illustrated one of the main questions surrounding the functioning of a tran-
sitional government in the présence of a major UN mission: namely, whether the National
Transitional Government of Liberia had the authority to sign concession agreements and
enter mto other long-term contracta. There was no resolution of this question by year's end.
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